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Airports, localities and disease: representations of global travel during the H1N1 
pandemic  
 
 
Abstract 
 
During summer 2009, the UK experienced one of the highest incidences of H1N1 infection outside 
of the Americas and Australia. Building on existing research into biosecurity and the spread of 
infectious disease via the global airline network, this paper explores the biopolitics of public health 
in the UK through an in-depth empirical analysis of the representation of H1N1 in UK national and 
regional newspapers. We uncover new discourses relating to the significance of the airport as a 
site for control and the ethics of the treatment of the traveller as a potential transmitter of disease. 
We conclude by highlighting how the global spread of infectious diseases is grounded in particular 
localities associated with distinctive notions of biosecurity and the traveller.  
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Introduction  
 
On 2 July 2009, four weeks after the official declaration of the first global pandemic for 41 years, 
the WHO Director-General, Margaret Chan, addressed a high-level meeting to consider some of 
the lessons learned from the spread of the H1N1 pandemic influenza virus. Drawing attention to 
the fact that she was speaking from Cancún, Mexico – from where the virus was transmitted by air 
travel to the UK – Chan declared that: ‘Recommendations to avoid travel to Mexico, or to any other 
country or area with confirmed cases, serve no purpose’ (WHO, 2009a). Building on the WHO’s 
previous, controversial, decisions to impose travel advisories during the 2003 Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak (WHO, 2003; Ali and Keil, 2006), Chan continued:  
 
‘They do not protect the public. They do not contain the outbreak. And they do not prevent 
further international spread.’ (WHO, 2009a) 
 
Indeed, she likened the transmission of influenza pandemics to a ‘tidal wave’ – something that 
cannot be realistically contained by travel restrictions. This natural disaster metaphor, frequently 
employed in sections of the media to conceptualise immigration (Charteris-Black, 2006, p, 570), 
was used in this context to illustrate how the virus can sweep through densely populated areas, 
leading to a steep increase in cases (‘with a sharp peak’), followed by a rapid decline (WHO, 
2009a).    
 
In this paper, we examine the first ‘wave’ of global transmission of the H1N1 virus by reference to 
new and existing discourses on travel and disease. A considerable literature exists on ‘pathologies 
of travel’, much of it historical, focusing on a number of themes including perceptions of European 
travellers in the colonies (Jennings, 2002; Livingstone, 1999, 2002; Kennedy, 1990), the 
significance of mobile bodies as a threat to the greater, Hobbesian, ‘social body’ (Kraut, 1995; 
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Cresswell, 2000) and the role of certain, defined, ‘others’1 in the spread of infectious disease 
(Joffe, 1999; Sontag, 1991). More recently, scholarly work has been conducted into the spread of 
infectious disease by air travel (Mangili and Gendreau, 2005; Tatem et al, 2006; Tatem and Hay, 
2007; Budd et al, 2009). A number of these studies, particularly in the field of epidemiology, have 
tested hypotheses and analysed the results for statistically significant differences. In this paper, we 
adopt a more qualitative approach, considering the messages broadcast by the UK print media in 
relation to the H1N1 pandemic. Moreover, we identify the importance of place in the context of 
emerging infectious disease. 
 
During summer 2009, the UK experienced one of the highest incidences of H1N1 transmission 
outside of the Americas and Australia (ECDC, 2009). The liberalisation of its aviation sector and 
the associated growth in international services at UK regional airports opened up a number of 
places through which infectious disease could enter the country. It is widely believed that the H1N1 
influenza virus arrived in the UK not via London Heathrow or Gatwick (the traditional entry points 
for all the UK’s long-haul airline traffic) but on a direct charter flight from Cancún, Mexico to 
Birmingham International Airport (BIA) in the West Midlands. Whilst its spread has been well 
documented by ‘official’ bodies such as the WHO and the UK Health Protection Agency (HPA), 
there is scope also to focus on UK media discourses. An emphasis on messages given by national 
and, especially, regional newspapers, in the context of the spread of a specific emerging infectious 
disease, sets this investigation apart from earlier analyses of international sanitary initiatives aimed 
at the global traveller (Budd et al, 2009; Bashford, 2006; Zylberman, 2006) and from work on the 
challenges faced by UK regional airports in preventing the spread of global disease following the 
liberalisation of the European aviation sector (Budd et al, in preparation). 
 
The broadcast media acts as an important ‘validator’ of scientific information, with reporters and 
editors making continual judgements on whose voice is heard and how that voice is represented 
(Gamson, 1999; see also Brown et al, forthcoming). Broadsheet titles perform a key agenda-
                                                            
1 Joffe (1999) argued that the ‘other’ in the spread of disease comprises ‘three interrelated phenomena: foreign 
nations, out‐groups within a society, and practices which are constructed as alien within the prevailing norms of the 
culture’ (Joffe, 1999, p, 26).   
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setting function, often being ‘preferred by politicians and other decision-makers’ (Carvalho, 2007, 
p, 226). Yet, as Brown et al suggest, ‘regional newspapers are as important in helping to shape 
public understandings’ (forthcoming). Consequently, we consider both national and regional 
reporting. 
 
Our study concentrates on a period of some four months, beginning with the first UK press 
reporting of the H1N1 outbreak on 25 April 2009, charting the progress of the virus through the 
summer, to a sharp decline in rates of illness during August and early September 2009 (HPA, 
2009a-e). This period effectively covers what Chan considered to be the ‘first wave’ of spread 
(WHO, 2009a). Our analysis commences with an overview of some existing literature on 
pathologies of travel, focusing on biosecurity practices in the UK and the international spread of 
disease. We then consider themes that emerge from the media discourse, notably the contrasting 
biosecurity practices being performed at airports overseas and within the UK, and their impact on 
the individual as a potential carrier of disease. In the discussion section, we locate our findings 
within existing debates on the airport as a site for the control of emerging infectious disease and on 
the representation of the travelling body. Finally, conclusions are drawn.  
 
 
Biosecurity and the airport 
 
Our research builds on two literatures. Firstly, scholarly work on national government control and 
biosecurity. Recent papers in this field, in particular the analysis of newspaper reporting of 
emerging infectious disease, have emphasised the problems of control faced by national 
governments in particular (Wallis and Nerlich, 2005; Nerlich and Halliday, 2007). Infectious disease 
has traditionally been represented as a threat from ‘outside’ (Kraut, 1995; Bell et al, 2006; Nerlich 
et al, 2009). Much of the rhetoric employed in this discourse has its origins in security policy 
research, where a distinction is drawn between the ‘outside’, deemed to be dangerous, and the 
‘inside’, which is ‘locked down tightly, secured and safe’ (Nerlich et al, 2009, p, 2; see also, Wallis 
and Nerlich, 2005; Chilton, 1996). In this perspective, rooted in Cold War literature on 
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‘containment’, a ‘unitary state actor’ provides the interface between the inside and outside (Chilton, 
1996: 408). The threat posed to a nation’s health by global infectious disease has been 
‘problematized’ as ‘biosecurity’ (Collier and Lakoff, 2008). Problematization – often associated with 
the work of Foucault (Rabinow, 1984; Dillon, 2007) – refers to the addressing of events or 
situations ‘not as a given but as a question’ (Collier and Lakoff, 2008, p, 11). ‘Biosecurity’, the 
broad heading given to technical and political efforts to secure health, has become a prominent site 
of enquiry as scholars seek to understand various forms of expertise and practices through which 
disease threats are articulated and managed (Collier et al, 2004; Collier and Lakoff, 2008; Bingham 
et al, 2008).  
 
Of particular relevance to this paper are the discourses surrounding the targeting of potential 
health risks (Braun, 2007; Bingham et al, 2008; Collier and Lakoff, 2008). Collier and Lakoff, in 
their analysis of ‘biosecurity interventions’ enacted in response to emerging pathogenic threats2, 
concluded that disputes surrounding the costs and benefits of such initiatives are in part about the 
‘politics of risk’, requiring:  
 
‘…new forms of political and ethical reasoning that take into account questions that are often 
only implicit in discussions of biosecurity interventions’ (Collier and Lakoff, 2008, p, 28) 
 
Braun, in his discussion of ‘emergent risks’, has argued that practices of biosecurity have changed 
the geographies of health security, and with this, the whole notion of surveillance and control. 
Increasingly, in an attempt at containing existing and future pandemics, he suggests that states are 
taking the fight against disease ’over there’ before it ‘reaches here’ (2007, p, 22)3. 
 
Secondly, a growing corpus of literature considers the spread of disease by global airline travel. Of 
particular interest is the increased movement of people across borders and the challenge this 
                                                            
2 For example, the authors refer to WHO protocols on the cull of domestic poultry in Cairo to safeguard against the 
spread of H5N1 – a measure that disproportionately affected the poor. (Refer also: Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008).  
3 Braun highlighted the increased attention being paid by public authorities to ‘emerging infectious disease’ such as 
avian influenza and the ebola virus, with ‘molecular life’ being ‘recorded as inherently unpredictable’ (2007, p, 17). 
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presents to national and regional practices of containment. The role of mass air travel in the recent 
worldwide spread of a number of diseases including tuberculosis, SARS and the present H1N1 
influenza virus has been documented, analysed and discussed by transnational and governmental 
agencies (WHO, 2003b; Cooper et al., 2006; HPA, 2007), clinical practitioners (Morens and Fauci, 
2007) and academic researchers (Colizza et al., 2006; Avilia et al, 2008). At the time of the last 
influenza pandemic, in 1968, 261 million passengers worldwide travelled by air (ICAO, 1968). In 
2008, passenger air traffic exceeded two billion (ICAO, 2008). Such high volumes of travel make 
containment more problematic. In a recent report, the WHO drew attention to the speed of spread 
of the current H1N1 outbreak virus:  
 
During previous pandemics, influenza viruses took >6 months to spread as widely as the new 
influenza A (H1N1) pandemic virus has taken to spread in <6 weeks… (WHO, 2009b, p, 249) 
 
In consequence, a general consensus is emerging that restrictions on air travel are likely to be of 
limited value in delaying epidemics (Cooper et al, 2006; WHO, 2009a). Instead, it has been 
suggested that the most appropriate solutions lie in a combination of national public health 
interventions to reduce local transmission of the virus4 and the international development and 
stockpiling of vaccines to compensate for global inequalities in public health provision (Morens and 
Fauci, 2007).   
 
In line with this strategic approach, recent scholarly work has focused not on the regulation of 
international travel but the regulation of the international traveller as he/she moves across the 
globe (Mangili and Gendreau, 2005; Tatem and Hay, 2007; Budd et al, 2009, and in preparation). 
In this literature, the airport has been perceived as a site of control, where mobile bodies can be 
mapped (Adey, 2009; Amoore and Hall, 2009). It is an enclosed space:  
 
                                                            
4 Examples include: influenza surveillance; prevention programmes featuring annual vaccination with up‐to‐date 
influenza and pneumococcal vaccines; and a national and international prevention infrastructure. The biggest 
challenge, according to the authors, would be to increase medical capacity and resource availability to the levels 
required (Morens and Fauci, 2007, p, 1025‐1026). 
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‘…that represent[s] the policing power of the sovereign state, that contain[s] the dangerous or 
risky elements of the unknown’ (Salter, 2007, p, 53) 
 
For the most part, this work has focused on screening against terrorism rather than disease (Adey, 
2008, 2009; Amoore and Hall, 2009) and on the practices of major airports overseas (Salter, 2007; 
Bennett, 2008; Lahav, 2008). Yet, in the last two decades, its role as a place of control, has 
assumed greater importance, with the liberalisation of the UK aviation sector multiplying the points 
of entry for ‘exotic’ diseases and placing the regions at the borders. This has compounded the 
challenge faced by regional airports in particular in finding the resources to help provide effective 
public health safeguards.  
 
When we merge the literatures on biosecurity and spread of disease, questions arise about 
‘containment’ and the traveller’s journey. These include the complexities of managing risk at 
various scales - international, national and regional – and the role of the airport as a site for 
controlling the threat of disease spread. In this setting, the traveller’s journey assumes a particular 
importance, and the ‘over there’ and over ‘here’ described by Braun (2007) take on new meanings. 
Our study examines these concepts of containment and the journey in relation to the H1N1 
pandemic. We focus on media representations of the outbreak, and the role of the press in raising 
public awareness by articulating concerns and shaping responses at both national and regional 
levels.   
 
Media analyses have been employed by scholars to examine interpretative inventories (for 
example, metaphors, symbolic dates, scare statistics) in the reporting of earlier, and in some cases 
ongoing, disease outbreaks such as SARS, avian influenza and foot and mouth disease (Larson et 
al, 2005; Nerlich and Halliday, 2007; Nerlich et al, 2009). In her wide-ranging study of risk and the 
‘other’, Joffe highlighted the role of the mass media in, firstly, ‘relaying’ scientific interpretations of 
new phenomena and, secondly, facilitating dialogues between individual members of the public ‘in 
pubs, on buses and around dinner tables’ (1999, p, 10). It is in such settings that existing images 
 8 
 
and metaphors – often projected by the mass media – have been used to absorb the new threat ‘in 
a way that reduces the fear that surrounds it’ (Joffe 1999, p, 10).  
 
In our investigation, we argue that media discourses associated with the H1N1 pandemic highlight 
the importance of ‘place’, and the airport in particular, as a focus for intense public debate on the 
exercise of biosecurity practices. Two key themes emerge. Firstly, we observe that the discourse 
describing international disease spread and biosecurity practices employed at overseas airports 
became increasingly critical in relation to measures taken against UK travellers. Secondly, we draw 
attention to contrasts between national and regional press reporting of biosecurity practices within 
UK borders. The latter theme is grounded in literature on ‘securitisation’ and the impact of the 
global economy on regional disease management.  
 
 
Methods  
 
Our analysis of newspaper reports utilised the online newspaper archive, Nexis UK, to identify all 
articles referring either to ‘H1N1’ or its earlier appellation - ‘swine flu’ - anywhere in the text5. The 
period searched was from 25 April 2009, when the UK press first reported this story, to 4 
September 2009, when the first purported pandemic ‘wave’ had subsided. Due to the high volume 
of the material available, it was not possible to perform a single analysis covering the entire 
timeframe. Consequently, individual searches - using the same terms - were conducted for whole 
months (i.e. April, May, June etc) with the exception of July where, due to the size of the dataset, 
two searches were undertaken (for periods 1-15 July and 16-31 July).  
 
                                                            
5 Our approach contrasts with methodologies being used by public health authorities, particularly in the United States, 
which make increasing use of web‐mining tools that monitor ‘hits’ on infectious diseases, for example, Google Flu 
Trends (Google Flu Trends, WWW). Moreover, mobile phone technology is being developed to allow for further 
patient input into public health surveillance through global positioning systems, text messaging and ‘micro‐blogging’ 
applications such as Twitter (Brownstein et al, 2009).  
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The timeframe incorporated reporting on: the emergence of an influenza-like illness in Mexico and 
California (25 April 2009), its arrival in the UK (28 April 20096) and its subsequent spread to 
various UK regions, the WHO declaration of the pandemic phase 67 (11 June 2009), the first 
reported UK death from the disease (14 June 2009), the peak of the ostensible first ‘wave’ of the 
pandemic (week ending 23 July 2009 (HPA, 2009f)) and its subsequent decline (August 2009). All 
articles, from main features to editorials and opinions, were included in the study. Duplicates were 
removed. Accompanying descriptive data, such as title, author (and affiliation, where relevant), 
recurring themes and use of expert opinion were collected and recorded. Figure 1, below, gives an 
indication of frequency of reporting on the virus during this period, whilst Figure 2 details the rates 
of influenza-like illness (ILI)8 in (i) England and Wales and (ii) Scotland9 during this timeframe. 
 
**Insert Figure 1** 
 
**Insert Figure 2** 
 
Following a single mention in the Northern Echo on 25 April, interest in the H1N1 virus surged, in 
both the national and regional press. Indeed, newspaper reporting during first two weeks 
accounted for over 20% of the total coverage on the disease throughout the timeframe. Following 
the initial surge in press coverage, the curves for UK newspaper reporting and ILI in England and 
Wales (by July experiencing significant higher rates than Scotland) are closely matched, indicating 
that the newspapers wish to both shape the agenda and foster public understanding during periods 
of increased influenza activity.  
                                                            
6 The UK’s first confirmed cases, Iain and Dawn Askham, in fact arrived in Birmingham on Thomson First Choice flight 
578 from Cancún on 21 April 2009 (The Guardian, 1 May 2009) 
7 Pandemic Phase 6 is reached once there is an ‘increased and sustained transmission [of an influenza virus] in the 
general population’ (WHO, 2005a, p, 7). By this point, an influenza virus will have resulted in sustained community 
level outbreaks in counties in at least two WHO regions (WHO, 2009c).     
8 The estimated weekly GP consultation rate is the measure used by the HPA to quantify influenza activity throughout 
this period. This matters as on 2 July 2009, following a UK government announcement on the pandemic, the HPA 
stated that it would change its approach to monitoring the outbreak, from issuing daily reports of cases confirmed 
through laboratory tests to publishing weekly reports informed by ‘a variety of indicators of overall flu activity in the 
population’ (HPA, 2009g, italics added). Although other indicators (such as QSurveillance®) are utilised by the HPA, the 
GP consultation rate is arguably the most comprehensive measure of ILI activity across the UK. 
9 Scotland is displayed separately in Figure 2 due to the differing methodologies used to compile the consultation rates 
(HPA, 2009h). 
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Figure 3, below, depicts the curve of reporting published during the first 14 days of UK newspaper 
coverage of the virus.  
 
**Insert Figure 3** 
 
As can be seen, the initial ‘surge’ in press interest, evocative of Chan’s ‘tidal wave’ metaphor, 
peaked at 368 articles on Thursday 30 April. Reporting during this early phase was fairly consistent 
across the national and regional press. National titles such as The Guardian and The Times, and 
including tabloid publications such as the Daily Mail and The Sun, comprised just over 40% of the 
stories published. The regional press accounted for the remainder, with 35 titles reporting on H1N1 
at least ten times during this 14 day period (see Figure 4,  below).  
 
**Insert Figure 4** 
 
The virus was given particularly prominent coverage in the initial hotspots in and around 
Birmingham (Birmingham Evening Mail, Birmingham Post, Coventry Evening Telegraph) and in 
parts of Scotland (The Herald, Scotsman and Scotsman on Sunday). Other locations reporting 
widely included Belfast (Belfast Evening Telegraph), Newcastle (The Journal) and London 
(Evening Standard).  
 
 
International disease spread and biosecurity practices overseas 
 
On 26 April 2009, The Independent on Sunday, under the headline ‘Pandemic fears as flu kills 68’, 
reported on the outbreak in Mexico of a flu variant ‘not previously seen in pigs or humans’ against 
which seasonal flu vaccine was ‘not believed’ to afford any protection. This outbreak was 
‘particularly worrisome’ according to one quoted expert because the deaths had happened in at 
least four different regions of Mexico and because ‘the victims had not been vulnerable infants and 
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the elderly’. Over the following week, a number of articles appeared in the national UK press 
detailing the rapidity of the international spread of the ‘new’ disease - a new strain of influenza - 
emphasising the challenges in attempting to contain it and drawing comparisons with previous 
influenza pandemics, which had also first struck in healthy young adults.  
 
The Daily Telegraph illustrated ‘speed’ of virus spread by documenting just one day’s 
developments (on 27 April 2009) when: official estimates of the number of H1N1 fatalities in 
Mexico almost doubled; evidence of the virus spread emerged in parts of Australasia; and the EU 
Health Commissioner issued advice against ‘non-urgent’ trips to Mexico and the US. Other outlets, 
including The Times, reported on the ‘enormous speed’ with which flu viruses could ‘mutate’ into 
something more pathogenic, potentially developing resistance to antiviral drugs (29 April 2009)10. 
The Express, a day later, described the spread of the virus across the UK. This was happening 
‘with frightening speed’, with the UK Health Secretary ‘admit[ting]’ that further cases were 
“inevitable” (The Express, 30 April 2009). In this context, national newspapers were, as early as 26 
April 2009, quoting expert opinion that it ‘may be too late’ to contain the outbreak (The Independent 
on Sunday). The Mirror reported that medical staff in Mexico had ‘struggled to contain’ the disease, 
resulting in fears that it could ‘sweep rapidly across the globe’ (27 April 2009), whilst The Times 
stated that public authorities ‘from every corner of the world’ were ‘scrambling’ to contain the virus 
(27 April 2009). The Daily Telegraph, relayed the WHO position on the futility of sovereign states 
issuing travel advisories, recounting that ‘borders ‘cannot halt swine flu’’ (29 April 2009). There 
was, therefore, a supplementary thread running through the early H1N1 narrative, implying that 
containment was impossible.  
 
The press sought to situate the new outbreak into context by highlighting previous disease 
outbreaks and places likely to be affected by disease epidemics. For example, reference was 
made to the 2003 SARS epidemic, with the Daily Telegraph noting that many of the Asian 
                                                            
10 One of this paper’s reviewers advised us to clarify that all influenza viruses, especially the H‐antigen influenza 
viruses, have the ability to either mutate or to genetically reassert their antigens. This occurs, firstly, with zoonotic 
influenza A strains, and then, secondly, with human strains. At the latter stage, with human‐to‐human transmission a 
reality, culling birds and pigs is no longer effective.  
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countries affected had been quick to set up thermal scanners at airports ‘to screen for feverish 
passengers’ (29 April 2009). This led to initially complementary media reporting on a number of 
practices being adopted by other jurisdictions to slow or even halt the spread of disease (The 
Guardian, 30 April 2009). Many of the measures focussed on the airport, and included: ‘reinforced 
checks’ for visitors from affected countries (for example, by the authorities in France); provision of 
additional medical staff (Australia); use of thermal imaging scanners (for example, Bulgaria, 
Australia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia); planned detention / quarantining of passengers 
suspected of carrying H1N1 (for example, Singapore, Vietnam, Australia, China, Russia, Taiwan 
and Bolivia); and powers to ‘disinfect’ suspected passengers (Australia) (examples extracted from: 
The Times, 27 April 2009; The Mirror, 28 April 2009; The Guardian, 30 April 2009). Although the 
UK press did not explicitly lobby for any of these approaches, their reports allowed comparisons to 
be drawn with the less formal measures being employed across the country.  
 
As the rates of transmission in the UK increased during the summer 2009, the newspaper 
discourse on technological measures of control employed overseas shifted from one of a sneaking 
admiration to condemnation. In part, journalists were documenting what they perceived to be the 
overzealous application of these measures as they began to impact on UK travellers. On 9 July 
2009, the Daily Mail reported on the quarantine ‘nightmare’ of Britons being held in ‘filthy’ 
conditions by the Chinese, describing how ‘masked officials’ boarded a plane, ‘subjecting’ all 
passengers to a ‘barrage of tests’ (9 July 2009).  The Sunday Herald reported on the quarantine of 
52 UK schoolchildren and their teachers ‘shortly after arrival at Beijing airport’ as the ‘flu crisis 
escalates’ (19 July 2009), whilst the Daily Telegraph recounted the experience of a six year old 
boy, kept in quarantine in Turkey with his family after thermal imaging cameras at Bodrum Airport 
showed he had ‘a very high temperature’ (25 July 2009). Subsequent tests revealed the child had 
contracted the virus.  
 
Questions also arose about the reliability of the technologies employed. Australia abandoned 
additional thermal screening at its borders for visitors, ostensibly due to its expense and stated 
ineffectiveness (Daily Mail, 25 July 2009; see also Roxon, 2009). A few days later, the Manchester 
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Evening News reported on the detention of a UK-based traveller (‘My hell locked up in Egypt swine 
flu ward’) who was subsequently found not to have the virus (30 July 2009). The actions of China, 
criticised for attempting to conceal the 2003 SARS epidemic which began within its borders (WHO, 
2007a; Zong and Zeng, 2006), came under particular scrutiny. Its measures were reported in some 
detail by The Times (20 July 2009) and the Daily Mail (25 July 2009). The former used largely 
measured language to describe the procedures in place which, although ‘stringent’, needed to be 
placed into the context of mistakes made by the country during the SARS outbreak. The Daily Mail 
report, on the other hand, omitted to mention SARS and employed vivid language to describe how 
passengers had their temperatures checked ‘up to three times before reaching the immigration 
desks’:  
 
‘Quarantine officers, dressed in surgical masks, gloves and medical suits, greet passengers 
once the plane has docked and file silently down the aisles, placing a temperature gun at the 
forehead of each passenger. Anyone with a temperature even slightly above normal is singled 
out, removed from the plane and taken to hospital by ambulance for further tests.’ (Daily Mail, 
25 July 2009) 
 
This passage evokes a fearful image of ‘the other’ (Livingstone, 2002; Driver, 2004; Hulme, 2008). 
The practices of a country, which has not been seen to hold human rights in high regard, were both 
a source of fascination and a source of dread, with anonymous quarantine officers portrayed as 
stealthily checking the temperature of each passenger, ‘singl[ing] out’ and ‘remov[ing]’ those that 
deviate from an expected norm. Whilst the article does express some approval for the albeit ‘strict’ 
measures, stating that they ‘appear to be working’ and citing the very low number of cases and no 
deaths among a population of 1.3 billion, its imagery forms part of a thread drawing attention to the 
strangeness of screening practices conducted ‘over there’ at the height of UK reporting on H1N1. 
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Biosecurity within the UK border: regional airports and the outward traveller 
 
In the early stages of the outbreak, there appeared to be little clamour in the national press for the 
UK authorities to take similar preventative action. Indeed, in certain instances, publications sought 
to put the current disease spread into perspective, indicating that there was little need to panic. 
The Daily Telegraph, for example, noted that this outbreak represented the first occasion that 
possible pandemic influenza could be treated using antiviral drugs (30 April 2009). In the regional 
press, by contrast, there was a sense of urgency; a need for the UK public authorities to do more 
to prevent further virus transmission. At this scale, the global processes and events outlined above 
were translated into locally relevant stories, and it is worth briefly considering the impact of the 
global political economy on localised disease management and biosecurity.   
 
In their analysis of biosecurity practices deployed during two recent UK bird flu outbreaks, Nerlich 
et al (2009) made reference to public policy discourse on ‘securitisation’. Building on Bigo’s work 
on the management of ‘unease’ (2002), whereby security measures are justified by threats from 
outside existing boundaries, they report Amoore and de Goede’s observation that practices of 
border control have the additional effect of producing ‘‘our sense of the insiders and outsiders in 
the global political economy’’ (see Nerlich et al, 2009). Whilst much of this discourse is beyond the 
scope of this paper, we identify in this section instances where ‘securitisation’ had an impact on 
regional institutions and infrastructure, mostly notably through the closure of local schools and the 
increased presence of health practitioners at local airports.    
 
Reform of the UK aviation sector has resulted in regional airports fulfilling new functions, in 
particular the hosting of long haul flights, resulting in greater risk of importation of global infectious 
diseases (Budd et al, in preparation). This has placed UK regional airport biosecurity practices 
under greater scrutiny. For example, BIA’s provision of direct flights to Cancún resulted in intense 
local and national media interest in their practices of control. The Birmingham Evening Mail 
reported that the airport was on ‘standby’, with medical practitioners being ‘briefed’ ahead of the 
arrival of a Thomson flight from that resort (27 April 2009). The preparations of other cities across 
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the UK also came under greater scrutiny as, in the words of a Bristol HPA official, ‘airports and 
ports posed an increased risk to the spread of swine flu’ (Bristol Evening Post, 28 April 2009). 
Indeed, other newspapers reported the cancellation of planned flights to Mexico from ‘their’ local 
airport, often quoting UK Foreign Office advice to avoid non-essential travel to that country (for 
example, Lancashire Telegraph, 28 April 2009; The Northern Echo, 28 April 2009; Daily Post 
(Liverpool), 29 April 2009).  
 
An analysis of this discourse sheds light on local attempts to contain the spread of the virus. These 
efforts appeared to be marked by uncertainty, a lack of consistency and, in at least one case, 
disputes as to the best course of action. A mismatch was highlighted between regional airports 
increasingly hosting flights to more ‘exotic’ locations, and the capacity of regional cities to manage, 
and prevent the spread of, an infectious disease epidemic. During the early days of the H1N1 
outbreak, BIA, and the Birmingham public authorities, had sought to reassure residents that they 
would be able to cope with such a public health emergency. Doctors and nurses at the airport had 
been briefed and would ‘be available if anyone [was] feeling unwell’ following the flight from 
Cancún (Birmingham Evening Mail, 27 April 2009). Similarly, airports in other UK regional cities 
used the local press to reiterate to residents that preparations were in place. Examples include: 
Glasgow (Evening Times (Glasgow), 27 April 2009); Bristol (Bristol Evening Post, 28 April 2009); 
Cardiff (Western Mail, 28 April 2009); and Newcastle (Morpeth Herald, 30 April 2009). 
Nevertheless, it became clear that practices at these airports differed from those in London, with a 
West Midlands based HPA consultant stating that there were no specific plans to approach the 
virus ‘in the same way as London Heathrow’ (Birmingham Evening Mail, 27 April 2009).  
 
In reality, practices of control also varied among regional airports and were sometimes not 
employed at all. For example, travellers arriving in Manchester from Cancún on 27 April 2009 – 
when the presence of the virus in the UK had yet to be confirmed – did not face any screening or 
questioning about H1N1 symptoms. A spokeswoman for Manchester Airport, defending this 
approach, was reported as stating that travellers were only being screened at Heathrow because 
flights landed there from Mexico City, the then centre of the outbreak (Belfast Telegraph, 27 April 
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2009; see also The Scotsman, 28 April 2009). At Heathrow and Gatwick airports, health officials 
and clinicians were reported as being more pro-active, boarding aircraft arriving from Mexico, 
asking passengers questions and checking them for symptoms of the disease (The Guardian, 27 
April 2009; The Express, 28 April 2009; The Mirror, 28 April 2009). The Scotsman reported that the 
discretionary approach adopted by UK regional airports was in line with HPA advice, with the 
government agency stating ‘blanket screening’ would not help fight the virus (28 April 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, conflict did arise within localities. In the West Midlands, for example, there was 
anger among parents at the reported failure of ‘health bosses’ (in this instance, the HPA) to close a 
primary school as soon as H1N1 virus struck, resulting in the spread of the virus to other schools in 
the locality (Birmingham Evening Mail, 11 June 2009). Moreover, in Birmingham, during the first 
week of the outbreak, GPs voiced concerns that the local Primary Care Trust had left them ‘in the 
dark’ on how to tackle a potential pandemic and had not been proactive enough regarding 
‘equipment, swabs, drugs, support’ (Birmingham Evening Mail, 1 May 2009). Global travel had thus 
become a local concern and, in relation to the global traveller, the regional press played an 
important part in publicising practices employed by airports and public authorities to mitigate the 
spread of infectious disease across borders. 
 
Articles in both national and regional press indicated that practices employed at such sites were 
‘ad hoc’ in comparison to those at major city nodes such as London Heathrow and London 
Gatwick. To finish our analysis, we turn to stories that focus on a more intimate scale – that of the 
individual traveller. In this instance, we demonstrate how the outward traveller – the passenger 
wishing to leave the UK – has come to be represented in sections of the press as ‘responsible’ for 
securing his / her own health and for behaving in an ethical fashion.  
 
The first representation refers to the intention of certain airlines and airports to ‘vet’ passengers for 
possible H1N1 symptoms and request doctors’ notes from those suspected of carrying the virus. 
On 19 July 2009, The Sunday Times was one among many newspapers to report that check-in 
staff at Heathrow and ‘other main British airports’ were ‘vetting passengers’ for possible H1N1 
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symptoms (19 July 2009. See also: Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2009; Daily Mail, 20 July 2009; The 
Guardian, 20 July 2009; The Times, 20 July 2009). These reports told of airlines’ intention to ‘turn 
away’ passengers suspected of having H1N1 if they were unable to provide doctors’ notes 
certifying they were ‘fit to fly’11. These practices were condemned on medical grounds by the BMA 
(The Times, 20 July 2009) whilst The Sunday Times drew attention to an Oxford University study 
stating that such measures would be counter-productive:   
 
‘… [the research] concluded that ‘“the most severe economic impact is due to the policies to 
contain the pandemic rather than the pandemic itself”’ (19 July 2009).   
 
Secondly, before being subjected to biosecurity procedures at the airport, the prospective traveller 
has been advised to reflect on and consider the moral implications of their journey, particularly if it 
is to the less developed countries of the global South. In early July 2009, it was reported that a 
group of Nottingham University medical students - having unknowingly contracted the virus in the 
UK – had unintentionally transferred H1N1 to Kenya, whilst travelling with charity assisting Kenyan 
orphans (Nottingham Evening Post, 1 July 2009, 2 July 2009, 3 July 2009; The Independent, 2 July 
2009; The Guardian, 3 July 2009). One month later, in a short article for The Observer, Professor 
Robert Dingwall of Nottingham University drew attention to the potential for the UK traveller, in 
particular gap year students working on developmental projects, to infect a population that may not 
be able to access antiviral medication and was more likely to suffer from severe underlying health 
conditions, such as tuberculosis (TB). He concluded that: 
 
‘While travel bans may not be justifiable, UK travellers cannot avoid thinking about their 
personal ethical responsibilities to the people of the countries that they are visiting. Staying at 
home this year will often be the morally right thing to do.’ (The Observer, 2 August 2009) 
 
Although it is important to remember that this is just one article, Dingwall’s opinion did nevertheless 
attract the attention of two national newspapers with differing political alignments (Daily Mail and 
                                                            
11 Reports named British Airways and Virgin Atlantic. 
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Morning Star) and a number of geographically diverse regional publications  (Belfast Telegraph, 
The Journal (Newcastle), South Wales Echo, The Western Mail, Yorkshire Post, Evening Chronicle 
(Newcastle).  
 
In both the above representations, the outward traveller was being depicted as someone who 
ought to practice control over his/her body, managing the risk it posed to the less advantaged 
‘other’. As suggested above, this inverts much existing literature in this area with its more fearful 
evocation of the disease-carrying ‘other’ infecting the social body (Charteris-Black, 2006, p, 570; 
Joffe, 1999; Cresswell, 2000; Kraut, 1995). It also contrasts with earlier UK national media 
discourse surrounding the 2001 TB outbreak in Leicester, which had been dominated by the need 
to control ‘diseased’ bodies wishing to enter the country (Bell et al, 2006).  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper develops the scholarly literature on pathologies of travel by considering UK media 
representations of the first ‘wave’ of spread of the 2009 H1N1 virus. The analysis has been 
conducted with reference to questions about containment and the traveller’s journey. Particular 
attention has been paid to the geographies of health security that dominate the print media. We 
draw attention to two findings: the significance of the airport as a site for control and a centre for 
technical ‘progress’; and the ethics of the treatment of the traveller as a potential transmitter of 
disease. 
 
Firstly, representations of the airport as a bounded setting in which the mobile body is ‘sorted’ and 
‘securitised’ have been given increased consideration by scholars in disciplines including 
geography, political science and sociology (Adey, 2009; Salter, 2007; Lyon, 2008). In our analysis, 
the airport assumes an important role as a site for the operation of various practices of control, 
ranging from completion of questionnaires to checking passenger body temperature using thermal 
imaging technology. It is a place where operations of containment were enacted and biosecurity 
interventions performed. In relation to press reporting, practices of control in overseas airports 
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were frequently presented as being technologically advanced. By contrast, regional airports within 
the UK were represented somewhat differently. Whilst their hosting of long-haul flights opened up 
new opportunities for the international traveller, regional press reporting focussed on 
inconsistencies between airports and, more generally, reflected unease about the ability of these 
nodes to manage the spread of emerging infectious diseases. In this respect, by not having the 
technologies or the infrastructure to conduct biosecurity practice rigorously, regional airports were 
frequently depicted as being less advanced ‘others’ within the UK. We argue that greater attention 
needs to be paid to hitherto neglected regional discourses in this area. In their general coverage of 
the current H1N1 pandemic, we found regional publications to be more pro-active than the national 
press, urging containment measures from public authorities situated in their locality. Their 
approach may, in part, be explained by the commercial requirement of regional newspapers to 
address as great a proportion of the local population as possible, thus creating a ‘community of 
readers’ based on membership of a particular place (Aldridge, 2003, p, 498). In this role, the 
regional press also serve as a disseminator of key public health messages produced both by local 
health authorities and by airports to give advice and reassurance to the local population. 
 
Secondly, our analysis has informed a growing literature on representations of the travelling body. 
Central to the media reporting were ethical questions relating to the traveller and the airport. On 
the one hand, there was a key role played by the airport as ‘censor’ and a point at which the threat 
posed by the at-risk ‘other’ could be minimised. Within this context, elements of the UK press have 
depicted, sometimes through a nationalist lens, the stringent deployment of technologies against 
UK travellers, in a way that both restricted their freedom and purportedly damaged their human 
rights. Equally, our analysis has shown that, in certain instances, the outward traveller is expected 
to behave in a specific, ‘responsible’, way. In providing evidence of ‘fitness to fly’, the UK traveller 
was required to exercise governance over his/her body. Moreover, in electing not to travel to the 
countries of the South, the UK traveller would demonstrate their ‘personal ethical responsibilit[y]’ to 
the population of the country they had planned to visit (The Observer, 2 August 2009). These 
representations of the ‘ethical’ long-haul traveller, policing themselves and showing consideration 
to ‘others’, contrasts with long-established narratives in which the Western traveller sought to 
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safeguard their own health against contamination from the ‘degenerate’ environment of the global 
South (Kennedy, 1990; Anderson, 2002; Livingstone 2006). In this paper, therefore, our analysis of 
biosecurity amongst UK press reporting during the first ‘wave’ of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
highlights how the global spread of infectious diseases is grounded in particular localities 
associated with distinctive notions of biosecurity and the traveller. 
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Figure 1: Number of UK newspaper reports relating to either ‘H1N1’ or ‘Swine Flu’ during 
period 25 April – 4 September 2009: weekly breakdown 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated weekly GP consultation rates for influenza-like illness (per 100,000) in 
England and Wales and Scotland12 
 
 
Source: HPA (WWW)  
                                                            
12 This data has been included in a separate chart to our newspaper analysis (Figure 1) due the different week‐ending 
date (Sunday as opposed to Friday in Figure 1). The National Pandemic Flu Service (NPFS) was launched in England on 
Thursday 23 July 2009. Following its introduction, and the start of the school summer holidays, the GP consultation 
rate in England dropped sharply.   
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Figure 3: Number of articles relating to either ‘H1N1’ or ‘Swine Flu’ during the first 14 days 
of UK newspaper reporting on the virus  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Number of articles relating to either ‘H1N1’ or ‘Swine Flu’ during the first 14 days   
of UK newspaper reporting on the virus: breakdown by publication13 
 
 
                                                            
13 Only papers totalling 10 or more reports over the surveyed period named in this table. National titles are in dark 
shading; regional titles in light shading.  
